only the guidance of very general legislative mandates. Both have failed
to build up any coherent body of doctrine that can be called a system of
law. Both have failed, not because there was nothing in the way of
extra-legal community they could help to develop, but because they were
compelled, or thought they were compelled, to create and shape that
community through adjudicative procedures. The inadequacies of the
community thus built, as well as the too frequent lapses from the judicial
proprieties that have characterized both agencies, are alike attributable to
an attempt to use adjudicative forms for the accomplishment of tasks for
which they are not suited. It is as if the courts of common law, instead
of laying down rules governing the making and interpretation of contracts,
had from the beginning felt compelled to write contracts for the parties,
and had attempted to hold a separate hearing for each clause as the contract was being written.
My final conclusion is that, like many other precious human goals, the
rule of law may best be achieved by not aiming at it directly. What is
perhaps most needed is not an immediate expansion of international law,
but an expansion of international community, multiplying and strengthening the bonds of reciprocity among nations. When this has occurred-or
rather as this occurs-the law can act as a kind of midwife-or, to change
the figure-the law can act as a gardener who prunes an imperfectly
growing tree in order to help the tree realize its own capacity for perfection. This can occur only when all concerned genuinely want the tree to
grow and to grow properly. Our task is to make them want this.

PEACE THROUGH LAW: THE ROLE AND LIMITS OF
ADJUDICATION-SOME CONTEMPORARY
APPLICATIONS

By ARTHuR LAWsoN
Director, World Rule of Law Center, Duke University
Before taking up my main task, which is to test the r6le of adjudication
on a sampling of actual current disputes, I should like to point out one
special reason that makes this discussion timely-its relation to the
Connally amendment. It has recently struck me that most of the "scare "'
arguments we have been hearing from the opponents of repeal are based,
not just on a misconception of the scope of domestic jurisdiction, but even
more on a misconception of the scope of the adjudication function.
Let me read you a typical example of the kind of circular that helped
produce the flood of letters that helped delay action on this issue in the
Senate. If the Connally amendment were repealed, according to this circular from the Patriotic Letter Writers, Inc.,
This Court, loaded with members of the Communist Party and their
dupes, would have jurisdiction over all areas of our lives, for Congress

will NO LONGER control our ...
Trade and Tariffs
Mental Health and Birth Control
Civil Rights
Post Offices and Censorship
Economics and Education
The Military
Foreign Trade
Welfare
Immigration and Emigration
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
In short, this circular says that the International Court is going to
usurp-not the functions of domestic courts-but the legislative functions
of Congress. The authors are not expressing fears about what would
happen in the process of interpreting the law and applying it to the facts
in a case between litigants, but are in effect saying that the Court will
dictate legislative policy to Congress, foreign policy to the Executive and
military policy to the military.
I have been repeatedly struck by the fact, as I discuss this issue around
the country, that most people have a very imperfect conception of the
real function of a court. I suppose this is why a preposterous leaflet like
this can create as much reaction as it did.
But just as there are some exaggerated misconceptions about how fifteen
men at The Hague (of whom fourteen are "foreigners" !) might conspire
to take over the dictatorship of the entire world, so there are some misconceptions that err in the opposite direction of underestimating the possible
contribution of law to peace. People often say to me, "I think this Peace
through Law idea is all very fine, but, after all, aren't most of the real
disputes in the world political, and hence out of place in court?"
Let's run down a list of some current disputes and see what the answer
is. To do this, we will have to confine ourselves to actual active identifiable
disputes, as distinguished from more generalized situations of tension and
unpleasantness. And, of course, we are concerned with the question, not
whether in this imperfect world of today the parties realistically are going
to submit these disputes to legal settlement, but whether the questions
themselves are of a quality that is inherently suitable for adjudication.

I. BERLIN
Berlin is once more in the headlines as the result of Khrushchev's speech
in Baku. Certainly this is one of today's most important disputes, and
hence a good proving ground of the importance of the potential, or at
least theoretical, place of adjudication in the preservation of peace.
Perhaps the most straightforward way to identify the quality of this
dispute is to recite methodically the precise legal issues that seem to be
imbedded in it. The list would include the following:
(1) The extent, if any, of the obligation of the U.S.S.R. to permit German personnel and goods traffic between West Germany and West
Berlin under the Jessup-Mfalik agreement of 1949;
(2) The extent, if any, of the obligation of the Soviet Union to permit
Allied military (a) rail, (b) motor vehicle or (c) air communications
between West Germany and West Berlin under

(i) an alleged agreement by Presidential correspondence, acceptance by non-reply or action or estoppel in 1945,
(ii) an alleged agreement by practice,
(iii) an alleged agreement by incorporation into technical day-today agreements in Kommandatura committees, especially the
Committee on Air Travel;
(3) The extent, if any, of the obligation of the Soviet Union to permit
the Western Allies to communicate between West Germany and
West Berlin under an alleged rule of customary international law
such as easement by necessity (a question which is the subject of
a memorandum inserted in the CongressionalRecord for April 12,
1960, written by Charles S. Sullivan at the request of Congressman vcCormack);
(4) The right, if any, of the U.S.S.R. to transfer the execution of its
obligations, if any, under the above headings, to the German Democratic Republic without divesting itself of its own liabilities to the
Western Allies;
(5) The right, if any, of the Soviet Union to divest itself of these alleged
obligations completely by according the German Democratic Republic "full" sovereignty (We have Khrushchev's opinion on this
in the Baku speech, stated not as a political fact but as a legal
consequence of a separate peace treaty) ;
(6) The obligations, if any, of the German Democratic Republic under
(4) and (5) above; and
(7) The question whether, in view of Article 107 of the U.N. Charter,
the International Court of Justice has jurisdiction, even if the parties
agree to jurisdiction.
It may be of interest to note that the Soviet Union is apparently not
arguing what would be another legal issue: the question whether the
quadripartite agreements have been frustrated and rendered obsolete by
subsequent events. The reason seems to be that the U.S.S.R. places strong
reliance on the Potsdam Agreement, which was almost contemporaneous
with the quadripartite agreement.
At this point we should recall that, even if a court finally disposed
of all these legal questions, this does not mean that the job of social ordering has been completed, or that the controversy is closed. The dissatisfied
party has a perfect right to go on from there and try, through one of the
other forms of social ordering, to get the legal position changed to one
more to his liking. In the Berlin case, and in the question of the future
of Germany generally, this might involve either further negotiation, or
voting, or both. The important thing, in a well-developed system of peace
through law, is that the justiciable issues be first disposed of by adjudication, and that we be not turned aside from this course by the fact that
there might also be political features to the case. Indeed, putting to rest
quarrels about existing legal rights might go a long way toward facilitating
a satisfactory political settlement. Thus, to change the example, if two

states are trying to work out by negotiation the utilization of waters in an
international river basin, and if one state has an exaggerated idea of its
present right under international law to divert water for its own use, this
unsettled question of present rights may of itself be the stumbling-block
which prevents a reasonable diplomatic agreement.
Moreover, just as a court does not necessarily dispose of questions with
finality, so a court also does not necessarily decide all the questions in a
case presently before it. If a party is asking relief which could only be
granted by the kind of law-changing that is beyond the power of the court,
the court will simply refuse the relief requested. The probable presence
of such issues, mixed in with the issues which the court can handle without
resort to unauthorized law-changing, should not scare us out of letting
the court perform its proper part of the dispute-settling job. This sort
of thing is certainly familiar enough on the domestic level. There is
probably no elich6 of judicial language that has occurred more frequently
in the last paragraph of judicial opinions than the sentence: "This, however, is a matter for the legislature."
As to Berlin, then, a large part of the current controversy revolves
around legal questions. It is not the function of adjudication to work out
a whole new set of revised treaties to govern the future of Berlin or of
Germany, but adjudication can help to keep the peace while any change,
if change there is to be, is worked out by other means.
II. SUEZ

Since I am confining myself to current disputes, I will leave aside the
Suez Canal nationalization issue. This issue, which was discussed at the
Society's meeting three years ago, seems to be fading into the past. It
might only be said in passing that there were legal issues at the heart
of that dispute, notably the right of Egypt to nationalize the Universal
Suez Company, and the obligations stemming from the 1888 Treaty of
Constantinople.
There is, however, a Suez problem that is both older and newer. This
is the dispute over the actions of the United Arab Republic in asserting
belligerent rights against Israeli ships and cargoes destined for or coming
from Israel, desiring to transit the Canal. Throughout the nine years
that this question has been under discussion, it has been consistently
recognized as involving a question of international law by all parties.
The first sentence of the note of Israel to the President of the Security
Council in 1951 asking that the case be placed on the agenda states:
In contravention of international law, of the Suez Canal Convention
(1888) and of the Egyptian-Israel general armistice agreement, the
government of Egypt continues to detain, visit, and search ships seeking to pass through the Suez Canal, on the grounds that their cargoes
are destined for Israel. . ..
Most recently, the Times editorial of Sunday, April 10, charges that the
continued stoppage of Israel-connected cargoes is in violation of international law.

This being so, in view of Article 36(3) of the U.N. Charter, which states
that legal disputes should normally be referred by the parties to the International Court, one might have expected a referral to the International
Court some time during the nine years. What actually happened? The
admitted legal questions were simply by-passed, under the leadership of
the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, in a resolution passed
by the Security Council finding Egypt at fault and calling on her to desist
from the practices complained of. The United Kingdom representative,
speaking on behalf of the three co-sponsoring Powers, said: ". . . these
legal issues are no doubt debatable, but I do not consider that it is necessary
for the Security Council to go into them. . . . The view which the Council
takes on this question should depend, in our opinion, on the actual sitaation as it exists rather than on any legal technicalities." The objections
to this brushing aside of the legal issues came from Egypt, as a party
in interest, and from China and India.
It is too obvious for discussion that the central issues here are justiciable
in quality, as has been conceded by all the countries involved. There are
such familiar questions as the law concerning contraband, visit and search,
blockade, the belligerent status of parties, the effect on the alleged state of
"war" of the Armistice of 1949, and the effect of the outbreak of hostilittes
in 1956 on the Armistice of 1949.
It is sometimes said or implied that one obstacle in the path of international rule of law is that some other parts of the world do not share
or understand our conception of law. The present case may be a salutary
corrective to any undue resort to this excuse. It is interesting here that
it was India and China that were on the side of giving respect to legal
rights. It is particularly ironic that they were demonstrating this devotion
to law in connection -with a body of law which was the peculiar creation
of European and American countries, i.e., contraband, blockade, visit and
search, etc., a body of law which, far from rejecting as alien, they understood perfectly and wanted to have applied.
It is still not too late to take this issue to the International Court.
Egypt's Declaration of Acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction is broad
enough to permit the question to be raised by one of the parties to the
1888 Treaty of Constantinople. The Secretary General urged this as recently as last year. But Israel-and this is a commentary on what happens when the judicial function is usurped by a political organ-has said
the Court action is unnecessary on the ground that the Security Council
action had disposed of the case.
Once more the conclusion is clear: the thing that is keeping this case
out of court is not inherent non-justiciability; it is voluntary choice.
III. SINO-INDIAN BORDER
Another dispute currently on the front page is the Sino-Indian border
dispute. Both parties here are claiming certain border territories and,
as I understand it, both are claiming as of legal right. The rules of law

applicable to the settlement of boundary disputes are rather limited, since
ordinary common sense and logic places a limit on the number of ways
in which boundaries are established and claims to territory made good.
There appears to be no real misunderstanding between Communist and
non-Communist countries on what the criteria are. In this case, the issues
are numerous, and vary from segment to segment of the frontier, but they
inclade the question whether there are in some cases boundaries agreed
upon by the parties or their predecessors in interest, and whether in
some places effective control has been established by one or the other
party up to the boundary claimed. These are eminently justiciable issues.
The issues are examined in a 30-page article in the January, 1960, issue of
the I1,ternationaZ and Comparative Law Quarterly by Alfred P. Rubin.
The latest reports in the paper are that the attempts of Chou and Nehru
to work out a settlement are heading for failure. After looking at this
30-page article, and trying to imagine Chou and Nehru struggling to
superimpose a political settlement on the complex legal uncertainties iivolved, one can feel only compassion for the negotiators.
I suppose it could be said generally that boundary disputes, where there
is a reasonable amount of history behind the dispute, as distinguished from
disputes which are the raw, unhealed wounds of recent conflict, are
normally proper subjects for adjudication. And some current instances
are in themselves potential threats to the peace.

IV. RFFuGEEs
Since this is World Refugee Year, it is appropriate to include the refugee
problem, particularly the Arab refugee problem, among current festering
sources of tension.
Some of the legal questions would be these: Did the refugees leave
voluntarily or involuntarily? Were they forced to leave by violence or
terror? Have they a right to return? Have the original legal rights and
duties now been made obsolete and incapable of implementation by continued Jewish immigration to Israel? If the Arab refugees do have
continuing rights, can these be satisfied by payment of damages? Again,
if these legal questions were cleared up, perhaps we could make progress
on the difficult political problems surrounding the plight of refugees.
V. AQABA
Finally, we cannot close this list without mentioning Aqaba, because
the controversy over the right of passage presents the international lawyer
with an entire symposium of questions of law. Does the Gulf "comprehend international waters"? To what extent is the Gulf not part of the
coastal states' territories? To what extent is the Gulf an international
historic bay? To what extent is the Gulf a series of territorial seas? To
-what extent historically is the Gulf an Arab gulf without any international
character ?

If the Gulf comprehends international waters, to what extent do the
laws of war apply to the Gulf and to the Straits of Tiran? What is the
law applicable to the Straits? Does it include Article 16(4) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the Geneva
Conference? Are the laws of war in force since the adoption of the U.N.
Charter, and, if so, are they applicable to Israeli or Israeli-bound ships?
To what extent is there a "war" between Arab states and Israel? Was
the so-called war legal? If not, is reliance on the laws of war admissible?
Has the Armistice of 1949 ended the "war" and thus rendered irrelevant
any of the laws of war? Has the 1956 fighting affected the 1949 Armistice?
Even if war continues, what are the rules applicable to innocent passage
anywhere? In the Gulf? Through the Straits? To what extent is the
right of innocent passage restricted by the "rights of protection of the
coastal state"? If there is no war between the Arab states and Israel, to
what extent is the relevant Israeli-bound traffic not "innocent passage"?
Here again, both sides are grounding their claims on rights under international law.
This, then, is a sampling of current controversies in terms of their
suitability for adjudication. Quantitatively, some of them might clearly
rank as major issues and some might be called minor issues. However,
in the world's present condition, it is a serious mistake to assume that
international controversies can be measured with a tape measure and
assigned a quantitative rating, and then to conclude that the danger to
peace involved in the controversy is in direct proportion to this quantitative size. The Aqaba dispute is perhaps small in size, but it could very
well be the spark that blows up the Middle Eastern powder keg. When
the powder keg has blown up, it is not going to matter whether the spark
was a big one or a little one. I think it is important to keep this in mind
when people raise the question whether the movement to strengthen the
international rule of law and the judicial settlement of disputes really has
a major part to play in averting war and building peace. People who
raise this question will sometimes say, in effect, "It is all very well to settle
disputes like Aqaba; but if the land armies of the U.S.S.R. start grinding
across Poland and middle Europe, what can these fifteen old men in The
Hague do to stop them?" The answer is that this is only one conceivable
way that the peace might be seriously broken, and it is by no means the
most likely way. It seems to me it is pointless to try to calculate whether
most of the world's controversies threatening the peace are capable of final
settlement through the judicial process. The important fact is that there
are many disputes threatening the peace that are in whole or in part
justiciable, and to the extent that these are cleared up by the application
of law through judicial or arbitral procedures, the prospects of peace have
been measurably increased.
In any event, at the present time it is the legal and judicial approach
to international dispute-settling that most needs strengthening, and that
presents the most promising prospects of improvement, among the three
varieties of social ordering.

